Narrative technique in the lives of the ten orators. by Pitcher,  L. V.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
30 May 2008
Version of attached file:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Pitcher, L. V. (2005) ’Narrative technique in the lives of the ten orators.’, Classical quarterly., 55 (1). pp.
217-234.
Further information on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cq/bmi016
Publisher’s copyright statement:
Published by Cambridge University Press. 2005 The Classical Association
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
 Use policy 
 
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without 
prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes 
provided that : 
 
 a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source 
 a link is made to the metadata record in DRO 
 the full-text is not changed in any way 
 
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright 
holders.  
 
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom 
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971 
http://dro.dur.ac.uk 
Durham Research Online 
 
Deposited in DRO: 
30 May 2008. 
 
Version of attached file: 
Published. 
 
Peer-review status of attached file: 
Peer-reviewed. 
 
Citation for published item: 
Pitcher, L. V. (2005) 'Narrative technique in the lives of the ten orators.' , Classical 
quarterly., 55 (1), pp. 217-234. 
 
Further information on publisher’s website: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cq/bmi016
 
NARRATIVE TECHNIQUE IN THE LIVES OF THE
TEN ORATORS 
I. INTRODUCTION
The ﬁfty-ﬁfth item in the corpus of Plutarch’s Moralia is a compilation of biographi-
cal information on the lives of the ten canonical Attic orators. The provenance of this
confection is mysterious, although critics unite in denying the ascription to Plutarch
himself. Ziegler’s description of it as ‘sowohl durch die Nichtbeachtung des Hiats wie
durch die ganze Darstellungsart sich als nicht plutarchisch erweisend’1 is representa-
tive of the consensus.
This assessment is not unfair. However, in some ways the work’s interest for the
student of ancient biography is enhanced rather than diminished by its dissimilarity
to the genuine productions of its putative author. The Lives offers the opportunity
to examine the technique and interests of a non-Plutarchan writer of bi´oi with a pre-
cision that is hard to parallel; one can analyse the author’s relationship to his sources,
his deployment of those sources, and the attitudes which these operations reveal.
For these purposes it is not crucial for us to know the real identity of our biographer,
referred to as [Plutarch] throughout this study for the sake of convenience. One ques-
tion worth tackling at the outset, however, is the question of whether ‘he’ was in fact a
number of people. Attempts to explain the work’s glaring inconsistencies and self-
contradictions2 have sometimes taken the form of postulating a group of authors.
Two considerations are worth bearing in mind, however. The ﬁrst is the brevity of
the work. Its contradictions are in such close proximity to each other that the collab-
oration theory simply hypothesizes several incompetent authors instead of one, which
is not very economical. The other is the observation that collaboration on any form of
literary endeavour is very rarely attested in antiquity,3 while single authors of multiple
short lives, such as Diogenes Laertius and Philostratus, are of course amply
documented.
This does not, of course, rule out the possibility that the Lives consist of different
strata of data laid down at various times by various different authors, perhaps as accre-
tions to an original text. This hypothesis has appealed to many.4 None the less, the
Lives do, as we shall see, display certain continuing themes and interests that, if
* I am indebted to Christopher Pelling for his numerous comments and constructive criti-
cisms on this piece.
1 K. Ziegler, ‘Plutarchos 2’, RE 21.1 (1951), 636–962, at 878.
2 See pp. 219–220 below.
3 A. D. Momigliano, ‘Pagan and Christian historiography in the fourth century A.D.’, in
A. D. Momigliano (ed.), The Conﬂict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth
Century (London, 1963), 79–99, at 96; his assertion there that the Historia Augusta itself
claims to be a collaborative enterprise is refuted by R. Syme, The Historia Augusta: A Call
of Clarity (Bonn, 1971), 23–4.
4 A. Schaefer, Commentatio de Libro Vitarum Decem Oratorum (Dresden, 1844), 37:
‘censeo autem vitas decem oratorum non multo post Dionysii Halicarnassensis aetatem ab
aliquo grammatico breviter esse descriptas in usum eorum, qui ad lectionem oratorum anti-
quorum accederent: post, quum in scholis rhetorum lectitari non desinerent, a compluribus
hominibus doctis indoctisque temporibus diversis interpolatas et ampliﬁcatas esse.’
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not evidence of a single author, are at least evidence of a single mind-set. These con-
siderations do not have the force of proof, but do perhaps justify us in treating the
Lives as the work of an individual, albeit one drawing extensively upon his
predecessors.
In any event, the study proposed requires a preliminary examination of the work
and its sources. Only thus is it possible to illuminate the traditions within which
the author works and to note the ways in which the arrangement of data which
Fowler decries as showing ‘little variety’ and ‘little or no distinction between mere
anecdotes and matters of real importance’5 can in fact prove to be very suggestive.
After this excursion into Quellenforschung, [Plutarch]’s own contribution to the
shaping of his narratives will be considered. Finally, this generalized treatment will
be tested through a detailed investigation of the Demosthenes, where the existence
of a biography by the real Plutarch and an abundance of other data for comparison
make so precise an enquiry viable.
II.THE BIOGRAPHER AND HIS SOURCES
At ﬁrst sight the Lives of the Ten Orators seems to yield itself up readily to source-
criticism. Twenty-eight authors are explicitly cited in the course of the work.6 This
readiness to cite authorities so explicitly is itself suggestive, as we shall see, but it
does not tell the whole story. One soon discovers that elements of the Lives which
bear no such citational warning-signs are dependent on sources which can neverthe-
less be traced. At 834C it is claimed that Andocides sailed with Glaucon to aid the
Corcyreans in the run-up to the Peloponnesian War. This is most improbable, since
the orator Andocides would still have been a child in 433/2.7 Moreover, an extant
inscription suggests that Glaucon was actually accompanied by Metagenes and
Dracontides.8 However, Thucydides’ account of the episode9 likewise asserts that
an Andocides, presumably the orator’s grandfather, went on the expedition.
Whether this is the result of a lapse by Thucydides himself or of interference early
in the transmission of the text is not germane to the present enquiry. The important
thing is that it is at least highly probable, as Fowler notes,10 that the error in
Thucydides is the ultimate source of [Plutarch]’s blunder.11
5 H. N. Fowler, Plutarch’s Moralia 10 (London, 1936), 342.
6 The complete list of citations is as follows: Aeschines (at 840F), Antiphanes (845B),
Aristophanes (836F), Caecilius (832E, 833C, 833E, 836A, 838D, 840B), Cratinus (833B),
Ctesibios (844C), Deinarchus (843A), Demetrius of Magnes (847A), Demochares (840E),
Demosthenes (836B, 840A, 840E, 841A, 848C), Dionysius (836A, 838D), Eratosthenes
(847B), Hegesias of Magnes (844B), Heliodorus (849C), Hellanicus (834B), Hermippus
(849C), Hyperides (849E), Lysias (833A), Philiscus (836C), Philochorus (846B, 847A),
Plato the philosopher (836C), Plato the comic playwright (833C), Satyrus (847A), Strattis
(836F), Theopompus the historian (833A), Theopompus the comic playwright (839F),
Timocles (845B), and Xenophon (832C, 845E). Cratippus is cited at 834D, but the passage
is probably interpolated.
7 Since he can plausibly claim to have behaved neo´thti in 415 (Andoc. 2.7; see further
D. Macdowell, Andokides: On the Mysteries [Oxford, 1962], 2, n. 8). The voyage is,
however, consistent with [Plutarch]’s belief that the orator was born in 468/7 (835A).
8 IG I3 364. Note that some conjectural supplementation is required, however.
9 Thuc. 1.51.4.
10 Fowler (n. 5), 355, n. D.
11 Jacoby (FGrH 323a F24 notes) uses [Plutarch] to argue that the elder Andocides was
present. He suggests that kai` Andoki´dhv o Lewgo´rou in Thucydides is ‘an interpolation from
the Vita of Andokides, which (as Ps. Plutarch shows) knows of Andokides’ participation in
the expedition . . . such an interpolation is easily conceivable, for the text of Thukydides was
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Other unacknowledged debts are betrayed by similarity in wording. Dionysius of
Halicarnassus, for example, is cited by name only twice in the text. However, the
exactness with which [Plutarch] echoes some passages of Dionysius is too great to
be the result of coincidence. The description of Lysias’ education furnishes a good
example.12 In similar vein, Ofenloch argued for numerous unacknowledged borrow-
ings from Caecilius.13
So much is unsurprising. A further query then presents itself. How much of this
impressive plethora of sources has our author actually read? Is it possible to
discern cases where the author’s erudition, such as it is, is demonstrably borrowed?
Some have attempted to bypass this problem by postulating a single preceding work
of which the extant Lives is a very careless and superﬁcial summary, a ‘history’ also
plagiarized in a later form by Photius to put together codices 259–68 of the
Bibliotheca.14 It will be noted that such a hypothesis, even if it were true, would
not go far towards accounting for the curious characteristics of the Lives, since it
merely creates the problem of explaining the curious characteristics of the Ur-Lives
from which they are supposed to derive. A more pressing problem, however, lies in
testing this sort of proposition in the ﬁrst place. By what criteria is it possible to deter-
mine whether references to earlier authors have been ransacked from a preceding
biographer?
One tempting line of attack would use the errors and omissions detectable in the
Lives that would have been rectiﬁed through judicious use of the full texts of the
authors so airily cited. For instance, [Plutarch] twice cites the Atthidographer
Philochorus (846B, 847A). However, diligent use of his Atthis would have resolved
at least one of the problems which faced the biographer, as a passage of
Philochorus15 conﬁrms that Andocides was indeed Kudaqh´naiov by deme afﬁliation
and not Qoreu´v, which is the alternative that [Plutarch] gives at 834B. If the biogra-
pher had possessed a full text of Philochorus, he should theoretically have been able to
resolve this and similar issues.
The problem with this line of thought lies in its assumption that if [Plutarch] had
access to an unexcerpted source, he may reasonably be supposed to have made the
in the hands of the rhetors who were particularly interested in Andokides’. If this were true,
[Plutarch] would be using a source independent of Thucydides. Note, however, that this does
not explain why Thucydides fails to mention Metagenes or Dracontides, that the only evidence
that Jacoby cites for the existence of this ‘Vita of Andokides’ is the orator’s entry in the Suda
(which does not claim to come from a biography and cites only Hellanicus), and that the
‘rhetors’ who were so ready to interpolate a reference to an alleged piece of diplomatic
spear-carrying by their hero’s grandfather oddly failed to draw attention to the appearance of
the man himself at Thuc. 6.60.2, where the manuscripts preserve the anonymity of ei v tw˜n
dedeme´nwn.
12 Compare Dion. Hal. Lys. 1 (sunepaideu´qh toi˜v e pifanesta´toiv Aqhnai´wn) with [Plut.] 835C
(sunepaideu´eto toi˜v e pifanesta´toiv Aqhnai´wn).
13 E. Ofenloch (ed.), Caecilii Calactini Fragmenta (Leipzig, 1907), p. xxii: ‘neque dubium
est, quin aliis locis, ubi Caecilii nomen non adscriptum est, tamen is rhetor in usum vocatus sit’.
Cf. also p. xxiii.
14 For example, W. Treadgold, The Nature of the Bibliotheca of Photius (Washington DC,
1980), 48. The elaborate hypothesis springs from the conviction that Photius was incapable of
originating the stylistic comments which are in the Bibliotheca, but not [Plutarch]. This evalu-
ation of Photius’ capacities is unduly pessimistic; cf. N. G. Wilson, Scholars of Byzantium
(London, 1983), 103–4, for a more balanced assessment. R. M. Smith, ‘Photius on the Ten
Orators’, GRBS 33 (1992), 159–89, argues, surely rightly, that Photius used [Plutarch] as a
basis but was himself responsible for rearrangement and supplementation. For more on
codices 259–68 of the Bibliotheca and their usefulness in illuminating [Plutarch], see below.
15 FGrH 328 F149.
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comprehensive use of it that a modern scholar would. Examination of the biogra-
pher’s methodology, however, reveals that such an assumption is perhaps unduly san-
guine, as [Plutarch] cannot in fact be relied upon to spot that different data at his
command contradict each other. Thus he is capable of asserting in the Isocrates
that Demosthenes was unable to pay the rhetorician’s fee (837D) and then, later in
the same life, that Isocrates poli´thn . . . ou de´pote ei se´praxe misqo´n (838F), though
neither statement bears the hazard-lights of a w v tine´v fasi vel sim.; it is noteworthy
that the version of this life in Photius’ Bibliotheca (codex 260) keeps the story about
Demosthenes but silently omits the claim that monies were never demanded from a
fellow citizen.
[Plutarch]’s failure coherently to organize the divergent strands of biographical lore
with which he is confronted makes this particular mode of source-criticism rather
unproﬁtable. Other modes of analysis, by contrast, work somewhat better. One par-
ticular fact which seems to have evaded comment in discussions of the Lives is
that their explicit citations from other authors are very unevenly distributed. For
example, three of the named sources enumerated in footnote 4 (namely Lysias,
Theopompus the historian, and Cratinus) are found together in the space of a few
lines in the Antiphon 833A–B but are cited nowhere else in the Lives.16 By contrast,
the comparatively lengthy Lycurgus, which goes into great detail concerning the
eponymous orator’s benefactions, personal habits, and political career, cites only
one source.17 The Isaeus too quotes only one source, but since that life is only
eighteen lines long, this is not so striking.
Further facts of interest attend upon this distribution. When one looks at the clus-
tered citations in the Antiphon, for example, one is struck by their precision; views are
attributed to Lusi´av e n tw¼˜ u pe`r th˜v Antifw˜ntov qugatro`v lo´gw¼ , Qeo´pompov e n t}˜
pentekaideka´t} tw˜n Filippikw˜n, and Krati˜nov e n Puti´n}. Elsewhere the citations
are much less exact: of the six references to speeches by Demosthenes, for instance,
only one is allocated to a speciﬁc oration (namely, the Against Neaira at 836B).18
The immediate solution to this divergence of practice that springs to mind is, of
course, that the passage in the Antiphon is excerpted from a source. As indicated
above, however, this solution, which in this case is almost certainly correct, raises
as many problems as it solves. Why does [Plutarch] use this erudite and diligent
source for a short stretch of the Antiphon but not, if his practice in the rest of the
Lives is anything to go by, anywhere else?
Illumination is best sought, perhaps, through consideration of the unique context in
which these citational pyrotechnics take place. The biographer invokes these auth-
orities not for a straight piece of biographical narrative, or even to compare differing
versions of the same event. When the authorities conﬂict on a simple question of fact,
as in the case of the divergent versions of the death of Demosthenes at 847A–B,
[Plutarch] may line up the dissenting sources,19 but he does not allude to speciﬁc
works. Rather, the Antiphon passage tackles the more fundamental questions of the
chronology of the orator’s demise and the identities of the proliferation of
Antiphons who still dog efforts to map the intellectual history of the ﬁfth century B.C.
16 Schaefer (n. 4), 31, notes the oddity that Theopompus is quoted for the Antiphon but not
for the Aeschines, Lycurgus, Demosthenes, or Hyperides, to which the Philippica would have
been more obviously relevant.
17 843A: peri` de` th˜v khdei´av tau´thv le´gei o Dei´narcov e n tw¼˜ kata` Pisti´ou.
18 C. P. Jones, Plutarch and Rome (Oxford, 1971), 83, claims that such precision is ‘a prac-
tice that Plutarch seems to follow only when he has direct access to a work’.
19 In this case, Philochorus, Satyrus, and Eratosthenes.
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Now, explicit discussion of chronological or prosopographical cruces is very rare in
the grand tradition of political, res gestae history that Jacoby dubbed Zeitgeschichte.
Thucydides and his successors may well have taken an interest in resolving such
problems to their own satisfaction, but it is unusual for them to ‘show their
working’.20 Nor does the focus on an individual enjoined by the genre of biography
per se entail a commitment to the detailed working-out of such problems; Plutarch’s
attitude to chronological conundrums at Solon 27.1 might charitably be described as
breezy.21
One should not forget, however, that there were in antiquity certain more obscure
genres of historical writing, set apart a little from political historiography and biogra-
phy a` la Plutarch, in which such discussions found a more prominent position. One
thinks of the Atthidographers, whose annalistic format made a concern for correct
dating fundamental to their enterprise. The Vita Aristotelis Marciana, for example,
preserves Philochorus’ sensible contribution to a heated debate over the chronology
of that philosopher’s career.22
In similar fashion, the identiﬁcation of rogue bearers of the subject’s name was a
staple characteristic of the sort of ‘antiquarian’ biography to which the genuine
works of Plutarch form so signal a contrast. Diogenes Laertius, for instance, regularly
catalogues homonyms at the conclusions to his lives of the philosophers.23 A later
example of this practice is to be found in the identiﬁcation of Qoukudi´dai polloi´ in
Marcellinus.24
The practitioners of these ‘antiquarian’ modes of historical writing characteristic-
ally demonstrate a far greater readiness to cite chapter and verse than their colleagues
elsewhere in ancient historiography. Writers of res gestae history are disinclined for
the most part to specify the titles, let alone the book numbers, of other texts to which
they allude, though exceptions to this rule are by no means unexampled.25 Plutarch
himself, although perfectly prepared to specify the titles of treatises to which he
alludes,26 appears only once to assign one of his quotations from Aeschines or
Demosthenes to a particular speech.27
Hence, both [Plutarch]’s uncharacteristic citational precision with regard to the
speeches of his orators, and the sort of discussion on which these citations are
brought to bear, suggest a source in the antiquarian tradition. It is thus possible to
appreciate that the style, vocabulary, and arrangement of data in our author’s handling
20 There are, of course, exceptions: contrast Thuc. 6.54–5 and Polyb. 12.4a. Christopher
Pelling remarks that the argument about the genealogy of the Tarquinii at Dion. Hal. Ant.
Rom. 4.7 is in the same category. It will be noted that when such discussions do crop up in
Zeitgeschichte, it is usually in the context of assessments of the (in)competence of other
historians.
21 This passage should not, however, be taken as representing Plutarch’s unvarying stance on
these matters; see C. B. R. Pelling, ‘Truth and ﬁction in Plutarch’s lives’, in id., Plutarch and
History: Eighteen Studies (London, 2002), 143–70, at 162, n. 3, and the passages there cited.
See also T. Duff, Plutarch’s Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice (Oxford, 1999), 312–14.
22 FGrH 328 F223.
23 For example, seven Aristotles at 5.33.
24 Marcellin. Vita Thucydidis 28–9.
25 Appian, for example, occasionally gives the titles of works to which he is alluding (App.
Celt. 1.8, Syr. 63.333, BCiv. 2.79.330). He also alludes to particular episodes in the text of
Homer, although he does not give book numbers (BCiv. 5.116.484), a not uncommon way of
referencing Homer in antiquity (cf. O. Taplin, Homeric Soundings [Oxford, 1992], 286).
26 Plut. Sol. 11 gives some good examples. Note that whereas Plutarch is there precise about
the provenance of his allusions to Aristotle and Alcmaeon, he does not specify the speech of
Aeschines which he also mentions.
27 Namely, the Against Meidias at Plut. Alc. 10.2.
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of a particular theme can be every bit as useful in exploring his use of sources as an
explicit citation.
This insight can be generalized and applied to different passages. For example, no
reader of the Lives can fail to be struck by the appearance of certain words which the
author uses in senses uncommon in standard Greek usage. Note in particular the uses
of the verbs a kma´zw and paratei´nw in describing the lives of the orators. Both verbs
are perfectly unexceptionable, but [Plutarch]’s deployment of the former in particular
is striking; in the works of the real Plutarch, the word retains its connotations of ﬂour-
ishing vigour, whereas our author sometimes uses it to mean simply ‘was alive and
neither very young nor very old’.28
A more unusual characteristic of [Plutarch]’s use of these verbs is a seemingly idio-
syncratic fondness for the perfect tense where the context does not seem to demand it;
h kmake me`n kata` tou˜ton to`n cro´non a ma Swkra´tei (835A), parate´taken e wv
katalu´sewv th˜v dhmokrati´av (832F). That this usage disturbed Photius, a man who
prided himself upon his feeling for Attic idiom, is shown by the normalization
of these tenses in the parallel passages of the Bibliotheca; the former becomes
sunakma´sai [rather than sunhkmake´nai] de` Swkra´tei tw¼˜ filoso´fw¼ le´getai29 and the
latter pare´teine [rather than parate´take] de` to`n bi´on e wv th˜v . . . katalu´sewv th˜v
dhmokrati´av.30
What explanation is there for these somewhat unusual usages? The problem is
resolved when one realizes that for [Plutarch] the principal use of these verbs is in
ﬁxing chronologies. In this sense a kma´zw is common in Diogenes Laertius.
Diogenes drew upon the chronological tables of Apollodorus, and it is instructive
to note that the only parallel for [Plutarch]’s use of paratei´nw in the perfect tense
to emerge from a TLG search of all the classical and Byzantine Greek historians is
in a quotation from that chronographer in the works of Clement of Alexandria.31
It is therefore tempting to speculate that the grammatical oddity which troubled the
sensibilities of Photius is a characteristic usage of chronographical scholarship, which
[Plutarch], lacking the inclination or capacity to recast his sources into an entirely
homogeneous whole, faithfully preserves. Now it becomes clear why our author’s
lack of stylistic pretensions makes the Lives so valuable as a document in the study
of ancient biography. The ‘pick and mix’ texture of the work is the result not
merely of recording different versions of events, but of the author’s utilization of
different modes of writing about the past in his sources, which, differing in style,
diction, and arrangement of material as well as in subject-matter, are responsible
for the curiously rag-bag quality in the ﬁnished product.
This is a large claim, and one best illustrated by means of an example. [Plutarch],
while unobservant, as we have already noted, with regard to contradictions in his
subject matter, is as resistant as most classical authors to the idea of repeating
himself.32 When he is compelled for the purposes of explanation to repeat something
that he has already covered, he usually remembers to insert a w v proei´rhtai.33 In one
instance, however, this resistance is notable by its absence. [Plutarch] twice informs
28 This age qualiﬁcation is patent at 845E, where it is remarked that Xenophon knew
Demosthenes h a rco´menon h a kma´zonta.
29 Phot. Bibl. codex 261.
30 Phot. Bibl. codex 259.
31 FGrH 244 F68C: Apollo´dwrov de` kata` th`n penthkosth`n o lumpia´da geno´menon
paratetake´nai a cri Darei´ou kai` Ku´rou cro´nwn.
32 This applies only to material covered in the same life, however, since [Plutarch] never
gives cross-references to different lives.
33 For example, Isocrates’ adoption of Aphareus (839B) and Aeschines’ acquittal (841A).
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the reader that Lysias was born in the archonship of Philocles, but the repetition of this
datum contains no reference back to the ﬁrst.34 There is, to be sure, a good reason for
the repetition of Lysias’ alleged year of birth at this point. [Plutarch] has just set out
conﬂicting reports on the orator’s age at his death, and it is therefore logical to insert a
reference to his year of birth. The inconcinnity between the two passages remains,
however,35 and calls for explanation.
I would tentatively argue that this lapse is the result of a clash between different
ways of structuring a biography. When [Plutarch] introduces birth-years at all, their
position in the life is not ﬁxed; they are not regularly found at any particular point
in the narrative. In the sort of antiquarian biography of which Diogenes is the most
voluminous extant representative, however, information about the subject’s ‘dates’
does indeed have a regular spot; it is usually in a position immediately after the nar-
rative of the subject’s notable deeds/sayings and before a discussion of their works. It
will be noted that this is exactly the point at which the anomalous second notice of the
orator’s birth is found in [Plutarch]’s Lysias, just after the story of the orator’s life and
before the catalogue of his speeches. A plausible hypothesis for the repetition there-
fore suggests itself, that the ‘antiquarian biography’ approach being used at this point
in the life tends to put the birth-date in a different location from the genre used earlier
on, so leading the impercipient author to repeat himself when he switches between the
two.
[Plutarch]’s failure to draw attention to his repetition is therefore somewhat akin to a
loose thread, a spot where the incommensurability of different ways of writing biogra-
phy is laid bare. Like all loose threads, it asks to be pulled. Closer study of the texture
of the narrative of the Lysias before the second reference to the orator’s birth reveals
something that, as the examples above indicated, tends to be signiﬁcant in this author,
a stylistic quirk or focus of interest which the rest of the Lives does not manifest. In the
case of the Antiphon, this was an unparalleled cluster of rigorous citations. In the
Lysias, by contrast, the anomalous phenomenon is a predilection for archon-years.
Archon-years are by no means a rarity in the Lives. Outside the Lysias, eighteen are
given in the body of the text,36 and a further three in the appended documents.37 Nor is
the mere quantity of archon-years in the Lysias38 unique; there are seven in the
Demosthenes, although one should note that the former life is approximately 35
per cent of the latter’s length. The striking characteristic of the use of archon-years
in the Lysias is rather that they are deployed in tight chronological sequence to
provide a clear temporal framework for the principal events of Lysias’ life, namely
his birth, his removal to Sybaris, the accusation that he harboured Attic sympathies,
and his arrival in Athens. This contrasts strongly with the more haphazard application
of archon-years elsewhere in the work,39 and should therefore provoke speculation as
to what it signiﬁes.40
34 835C: geno´menov d Aqh´nhsin e pi` Filokle´ouv a rcontov; 836A: gennhqh˜nai de´ fasin e pi`
Filokle´ouv a rcontov.
35 Note too that what is presented as a plain fact at 835C becomes a more cautious gennhqh˜nai
de´ fasin at 836A.
36 At 833D, 835A, 836F, 837E, 839D (bis), 842F, 843C, 844A, 844C, 845D (bis), 845E (bis),
847D (bis), 850B, 850D.
37 At 851D, 851E, and 851F.
38 There are archon-years in the Lysias at 835C, 835D (ter), 835E, and 836A; there is also a
reference to a narci´av th˜v pro` Eu klei´dou at 835F.
39 Contrast, for example, the rather chaotic application of archon-years at 845E.
40 Ofenloch (n. 13), p. xxv, noting that the whole of this life ‘optima coniunctione verborum
et sententiarum continua est’, was inclined to attribute it all to a lost Life of Lysias by Caecilius.
THE LIVES OF THE TEN ORATORS 223
An answer is not far to seek, as a passage in Diogenes Laertius’ life of Aristotle
adopts a mode of narration strikingly similar to that which is found in the Lysias.41
Once again the key stages in the protagonist’s life and, above all, his movements
from one place to another are neatly structured around archon-years; Aristotle’s
migrations to Mytilene, Hermias, and Philip all receive such a date. Diogenes,
however, is obliging enough to preface this account with the words fhsi` d
Apollo´dwrov e n Cronikoi˜v.42 The similarity in the focus of narration and the packa-
ging of the data, therefore, makes it very likely that [Plutarch]’s aberrant conglomera-
tion of archon-years derives from the characteristic concerns and style of Apollodoran
chronography. ‘As always, material determines treatment.’43
Note too, at the end of this little ﬂare of chronological concern, a ﬂicker of interest
in the sort of feat of synchronization that appealed to the chronographers and those
whom they inﬂuenced:44 the reader is assured that the aged Lysias saw the youthful
Demosthenes. It is, of course, wildly improbable that the contemporary sources for
Lysias’ old age saw ﬁt to chronicle all his meetings with the youth of Athens on
the off chance that one of the latter might later attain eminence. The comment
stems rather from the ‘since x died then, and y was born then, x would have been
able to meet y’ reasoning characteristic of a chronologer with an interest in cultural
history. Finally, the conjecture that this extended chronographical lore is limited to
the person of Lysias45 is conﬁrmed by the fact that on the two occasions in other
lives when [Plutarch] gives precise relative ages (namely ‘x was y years younger/
older than z’), Lysias always seems to have been included as the other term,
though it should be stressed that the considerable textual problems in both of these
passages make this evidence rather insecure.46
This survey of [Plutarch]’s relationship to the sources on which he depends has
been of necessity very selective, focusing only on a number of paradigmatic passages.
Examination of every citation of a preceding author and every passage where a par-
ticular predecessor may be inferred would have swollen this study to unmanageable
proportions. This enforced brevity has not, however, prevented certain themes from
emerging.
41 Diog. Laert. 5.9–10.
42 ¼FGrH 244 F38A.
43 R. Syme, The Augustan Aristocracy (Oxford, 1986), preface.
44 Cf. Ap. Rhod. 1.553–8, where Chiron brings the infant Achilles to see off the Argo on its
voyage. The exercise continues to appeal; cf. the chronological chain back to Charles II at C. M.
Bowra, Memories: 1898–1939 (Cambridge, 1966), 138, and the role played by a very young
John Webster in the ﬁlm Shakespeare In Love.
45 ‘Extended’ should be emphasized here; we have already seen traces of chronographical
vocabulary elsewhere in the Lives.
46 835A [of Andocides]: w st ei nai presbu´teron au to`n Lusi´ou e tesi´ pou †e kato´n; 836F [of
Isocrates]: knew´terov me`n Lusi´oul dusi` kai` ei kosin e tesi, presbu´terov de` Pla´twnov e pta´. In
835A the manuscripts read e kato´n, which even [Plutarch] would have recognized as false;
the name or the number must be corrupt, and critics have rightly preferred to emend the
latter (de´ka Westermann; o ktw´ Taylor). The problem at 836F is more serious. The text in the
manuscripts appears lacunose and the word Lusi´ou is only a supplement (proposed by
Bernardakis, following Wolf). It is, however, a likely one. presbu´terov de` in the manuscripts
hints at the loss of a preceding new´terov me´n; Lusi´ou would provide a neat explanation for
the omission, which would have been caused by the homoearcton with Lusima´cou
Murrinousi´ou in the preceding line, and it is consistent with the entire ancient tradition to
claim that Isocrates was twenty-two years younger than Lysias. Whether Lysias was actually
born in 459/8 is a moot point, but one not germane to the present discussion; see C. Carey,
Lysias: Selected Speeches (Cambridge,1989), p. ix, for the arguments.
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Above all, the folly of lumping our author’s sources together under the commo-
dious designation of ‘the biographical tradition’ has become plain. The texture of
the Lives is disconcerting not because it reﬂects simple disagreements on matters
of fact between its sources; such problems are after all present in the genuine
works of Plutarch, if not in such opulent profusion. Rather, [Plutarch]’s failure to
forge a homogeneous stylistic whole presents the reader with a promiscuous welter
of different ways of writing about the past, from the epigraphy underlying the
Lycurgus to the chronographical mode underlying part of the Lysias. It is this that pro-
duces the chaotic effect, and makes the Lives of the Ten Orators perhaps the single
most compelling demonstration of the wisdom of Momigliano’s insistence on the
Protean character of early Greek biography.47
However, the methodology which this study has deployed so far risks giving a
somewhat partial picture of the Lives. Stress has been laid on the author’s unwilling-
ness or inability to impose stylistic uniformity, and the ways in which this enables the
careful reader to lay bare the nature of his sources. Yet [Plutarch] is not altogether a
thing of shreds and patches; it is perhaps possible to see places where his own agenda
and consistent interests are evident in his management of his material. The next
section of this study will therefore focus on some of these passages.
III. THE LIVES OF THE TEN ORATORS ON THE HISTORY AND PRACTICE
OF RHETORIC
The heterogeneous character of the Lives may seem to make reference to their ‘inter-
ests’, as if they were consistent, hard to justify. Nevertheless, two test cases indicate
instances where the author’s own views on the nature of the past and the generic press-
ures imposed by the sort of format that he has adopted make such a conclusion more
compelling.
As in the previous section, it proves useful to work up to wider conclusions through
study of a problematic passage. In this case, an interesting point of departure is
afforded by the comments which our author appends to the claim that Antiphon
was the ﬁrst to write forensic speeches for those in need of them, w sper tine´v fasi.
[Plutarch] then (832D) tries to back up this assertion48 with the observation that
there are no forensic speeches extant from the pens of either those who lived
before Antiphon or tw˜n kat au to´n . . . ou Qemistokle´ouv ou k Aristei´dou ou
Perikle´ouv, because there was not yet any custom of speech-writing, dia` to`
mhde´pw e n e qei tou˜ suggra´fein ei nai.
The statement itself is unremarkable. The terms of reference that it implies,
however, give pause for thought. The problem is that the threesome of
Themistocles, Aristides, and Pericles is at once too ample and too restricted in its
compass to have a pellucid effect. On the one hand it is disconcerting to ﬁnd the
obvious duo of Themistocles and Aristides supplemented by the much younger
Pericles, while on the other, one wonders why the list stops where it does. Pericles
was not the only skilled persuader at large in Athens in the second half of the ﬁfth
century B.C. What about Cleon, tw¼˜ . . . dh´mw¼ para` polu` e n tw¼˜ to´te piqanw´tatov,49
47 A. D. Momigliano, The Development of Greek Biography (Cambridge, MA, 1993), 88.
48 gou˜n in the ﬁrst sentence of 832D is used ‘to introduce a statement which is, pro tanto,
evidence for a preceding statement’ (J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles [Oxford, 19542],
451).
49 Thuc. 3.36.6.
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or the demagogues who succeeded him and were handled at unﬂattering length, it
would appear, in the tenth book of the Philippica of Theopompus?50
The signiﬁcance of this passage should not be blown out of proportion. [Plutarch] is
not, after all, suggesting that this is an exhaustive list of eloquent speakers active in the
Athens of the ﬁfth century. He just needs a few examples of predecessors and/or con-
temporaries of Antiphon whom one might have expected, given their oratorical
prowess, to have contested his forensic primacy.
One might, therefore, be tempted to put down this passage to authorial whim. Such
a response is perhaps, however, a little precipitate. I would tentatively suggest that
what the reader encounters here is a case of the usually difﬁdent author attempting
to impose a structure on the recalcitrant material at his disposal. To be more
precise, [Plutarch]’s sense of the appropriate way in which to begin the sort of enter-
prise that he is undertaking is clashing with the stubbornly static Canon of the Ten that
he has inherited.
The date at which the Canon of the Ten Orators came into being has been keenly
disputed, as have the reasons for its creation. For the purposes of this discussion,
however, it is necessary to note only two salient points. Firstly, the Canon was in
all probability in place before the time of our author (whenever that may have
been) since it appears that Quintilian was aware of it.51 Secondly, it is most unlikely
that it was intended to map the development of Attic oratory from a diachronic per-
spective. Whether those who were allotted places in the pantheon won them through
the perceived purity of their Attic diction or a more general criterion of ‘greatness’
remains a matter for conjecture, but it seems highly improbable that the idea was
to give a sense of the historical development of the genre, any more than The
Nation’s Favourite Love Poems seeks to plot the metamorphosis of erotic verse
from amour courtois to ‘Celia, Celia’.
Now consider the two other famous collections of potted Greek biographies which
are still extant: Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of the Philosophers and the Lives of the
Sophists written by Flavius Philostratus. It will be noted that each of these enterprises
opens with an account of the discipline of which its subjects were practitioners. Thus
the opening sentence of Diogenes asserts that to` th˜v filosofi´av e rgon e nioi´ fasin a po`
barba´rwn a rxai,52 and the biographer then goes on to identify Greek originators of the
discipline in the persons of Musaeus and Linus.53 Philostratus in similar vein sketches
out an early relationship between sofistikh` r htorikh´ and philosophy,54 and then
identiﬁes Gorgias and Aeschines as the originators of the two types of rhetoric.55
These passages illuminate [Plutarch]’s problem. The generic propriety of the
‘potted biography’ format, antiquity’s closest approach to what we would call cultural
history, impels him to delineate at the outset of his enterprise the origins of the dis-
cipline practised by his subjects and to isolate its originator(s). He is immediately
faced, however, with the difﬁculty that Antiphon, the ﬁrst of the canonical Attic
orators, cannot be regarded as the prw˜tov eu reth´v of oratory, which was clearly in
50 FGrH 115 FF85–100. This capacious catalogue seems to have stretched from
Themistocles to Eubulus.
51 For analysis of the relevant passages, see I. Worthington, ‘The Canon of the Ten Attic
Orators’, in I. Worthington (ed.), Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action (London and
New York, 1994), 244–63, at 249–59.
52 Diog. Laert. 1.1.
53 Diog. Laert. 1.3.
54 Philostr. VS 480.
55 Philostr. VS 481.
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place long before. He therefore has to resort to something that Antiphon was the ﬁrst
to do in order to give him some reason for starting his coverage of oratory where he
does; hence the emphasis on the orator’s unprecedented composition of forensic
speeches for the assistance of needy litigants.
This explains why [Plutarch]’s coverage of this particular innovation is so explicit
and exhaustive, when his treatment of later departures from previous practice, such as
Isaeus’ introduction of sch´mata,56 is much more cursory in its coverage. The draw-
back of this piece of ingenuity is that the reader is thereby given a misleading
impression of the focus of the coming biographies. Diogenes uses a discussion of
the origins of philosophy to introduce lives of philosophers and Philostratus a discus-
sion of the genesis of sophistic rhetoric to introduce lives of sophists. By this logic,
one would expect [Plutarch]’s initial emphasis on the development of forensic
oratory to lead to the biographies of forensic orators. The Lives, however, shows no
such inclination to privilege dikanikoi` lo´goi, or any type of rhetoric, over any of
the other types.57 The tension between the inherited canon’s synchronic gallery of
merit and the ‘potted biography’ genre’s emphasis on diachronic development has
forced our author into a not entirely successful effort to square the circle, hence the
somewhat incongruous nature of this passage.
It is instructive to contrast Cicero’s reﬂections on Attic oratory at Brutus 26–7.
Untrammelled by [Plutarch]’s cramping canon, the Roman orator is free to people
his stage with rather more players and allude to the inferred rhetorical prowess of
Pisistratus, Solon, and Cleisthenes,58 all of whom our author lumps anonymously
together as tw˜n . . . pro au tou˜ genome´nwn, as well as commenting on the skills of
Cleon, Alcibiades, Critias, and Theramenes.59 For [Plutarch], this strategy would
be more problematic, as extensive coverage of orators outside the canon points up
the rather arbitrary nature of its selection criteria when viewed from the diachronic
perspective enjoined by cultural history.
The curious passage at the start of the Antiphon gives a demonstration that the
‘potted biography’ format of the Lives is not just a capacious bag into which assorted
data can be ﬂung willy-nilly; the form exerts its own inﬂuence on the way in which
data and arguments are presented. It is also possible, perhaps, to detect our author in
occasional efforts to impose his own order on the data that he has inherited. This is
most evident in his treatment of the nature of rhetoric itself.
It is a central paradox of the Lives of the Ten Orators that the author of a work
concerned with some of the most stylish and elegant writers of Attic prose does
not in fact seem to be very interested in matters of style. [Plutarch] does deliver
short summaries of the stylistic features of some of the ten,60 reports Isocrates’
alleged derivation of his Panegyricus from Gorgias and Lysias (837F), and shows
an interest in matters of actio such as the linguistic mannerisms of Demosthenes
(845B) and the vocal qualities of Isocrates (837A) and Aeschines (840E).
However, some of the orators (notably Lycurgus) escape stylistic evaluation
56 839F: prw˜tov de` kai` schmati´zein h rxato kai` tre´pein e pi` to` politiko`n th`n dia´noian.
57 Thus [Plutarch] is equally accommodating to, for example, Lysias’ speech at Olympia
(836D), Isocrates’ epideictic extravaganzas (837F), and Hyperides’ skill at symbouleutic rheto-
ric (849D).
58 Cic. Brut. 27: opinio est . . . Pisistratum et . . . Solonem posteaque Clisthenem multum
valuisse dicendo.
59 Cic. Brut. 28: Cleonem . . . eloquentem constat fuisse; 29: huic aetati suppares Alcibiades
Critias Theramenes.
60 Antiphon at 832E, Andocides at 835B, Lysias at 836B, Isaeus at 839E, and Deinarchus at
850E.
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altogether, and even the characterizations that are included have some curious aspects;
while that of Andocides, for example, is expressed in wholly unexceptionable critical
vocabulary,61 that of Antiphon concerns itself almost entirely with inventio and is
couched in very peculiar terms.62 Again, a curious ﬂuctuation in our author’s use
of his sources is evident here; while a sentence from Dionysius’ essay on Isaeus is
repeated almost word for word in order to deﬁne the orator’s resemblance to
Lysias,63 the critic’s examination of the stylistic qualities of Isocrates in his essay
on that orator is not used at all. It is once more helpful to consider the reaction of
Photius, whose interest in matters of style was keenly developed.64 The future patri-
arch, clearly feeling [Plutarch]’s coverage of this topic to be jejune, supplemented the
stylistic analyses extensively.65
[Plutarch]’s disinclination to spend much time on analysis of the stylistic qualities
of his subjects is reﬂected, perhaps, in his general lack of interest in the notion of style
as an expression of character, an idea well established in ancient literature,66 and one
that might well be expected to have appealed to a biographer.67 More signiﬁcant for
the present purposes, however, is his resistance to the attempts enshrined in one of his
most important sources to deconstruct the opposition, in modern parlance, between
philosophy and rhetoric. The most explicit example of this idea is the preface to
the discussions of the ancient orators written by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, where
the critic hails the return of h . . . a rcai´a kai` filo´sofov r htorikh´, as opposed to the
inferior variant which arose a po` th˜v Alexa´ndrou tou˜ Makedo´nov teleuth˜v.68 The
means by which rhetoric can be made ‘philosophical’ are made clear in Dionysius’
Isocrates.69
[Plutarch]’s views on the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric, however,
seem to have been rather more old-fashioned, in that he appears to embrace the stan-
dard division between the contemplative ivory-tower nature of philosophy and the
political engagement characteristic of rhetoric. He is perfectly prepared, it is true,
to note that some considered Aeschines, Demosthenes, Lycurgus, and Hyperides to
have been imitators or students of Plato.70 For all except Aeschines, however, he is
quick to introduce the alternative mentor Isocrates, and the phraseology of the
Lycurgus passage in particular shows that he views philosophy and rhetoric not as
fundamentally indissoluble but rather as distinct and discrete paths of life.71
61 835B: e sti d a plou˜v kai` a kata´skeuov e n toi˜v lo´goiv, a felh´v te kai` a schma´tistov. That
a kata´skeuov and a felh´v go naturally together in this sort of critical vocabulary is shown by
their proximity at Dion. Hal. Dem. 39: [of the less elevated syle] a poih´twv de´ pwv kai`
a felw˜v . . . kateskeua´sqai bou´letai, para´deigma poioume´nh th`n a kata´skeuon fu´sin.
62 832E; I am very grateful to Professor D. A. Russell for discussing this passage with me.
63 Dion. Hal. Isaeus 2: ei mh´ tiv e mpeirov pa´nu tw˜n a ndrw˜n ei h . . . ou k a n diagnoi´h r a¼di´wv
pollou`v tw˜n lo´gwn, o pote´rou tw˜n r hto´rwn ei si´n. Cf. [Plut.] 839E.
64 Wilson (n. 14), 103.
65 R. M. Smith, ‘Photius on the Ten Orators’, GRBS 33 (1992), 159–89, and id., ‘A hitherto
unrecognized fragment of Caecilius’, AJP 60 (1994), 3–7, deal at length with Photius’ additions
to [Plutarch]. I am indebted to Dr D. Innes for drawing my attention to these articles.
66 The classic treatment is in Sen. Ep. 114.
67 See below for its use in Plutarch’s Demosthenes.
68 Dion. Hal. Concerning the Orators of Old 1.
69 For example, Dion. Hal. Isoc. 4: kai` ei tiv e pithdeu´ei th`n a lhqinh`n filosofi´an, mh` to`
qewrhtiko`n au th˜v mo´non a gapw˜n a lla` kai` to` praktiko´n . . . parakeleusai´mhn a n au tw¼˜ th`n
e kei´nou tou˜ r h´torov mimei˜sqai proai´resin.
70 840B (Aeschines); 841B (Lycurgus); 844B–C (Demosthenes); 848D (Hyperides).
71 841B: a kroath`v de` geno´menov Pla´twnov . . . ta` prw˜ta e filoso´fhsen. ei ta kai` Isokra´touv
. . . gnw´rimov geno´menov e politeu´sato e pifanw˜v.
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It might be argued that this view of the opposition between rhetoric and philosophy
is simply imported from older sources which did not share the deconstructing zeal of
Dionysius. Against this argument, however, one notes that [Plutarch] can be detected
in the act of strategically recasting Dionysian material in order to make it accord with
the more traditional dichotomy between rhetoric and philosophy to which he himself
adheres. It is instructive to look at a signiﬁcant way in which his account of the life of
Isocrates differs from that offered by Dionysius.
Both writers note that at one stage in his life Isocrates turned to the writing of
morally improving works and tried to set out the nature of his thought, in phraseology
so nearly identical that [Plutarch] is clearly drawing upon Dionysius.72 Dionysius,
however, implies that this was the way in which Isocrates spent the rest of his life,
and thus that all of his subsequent work is to be seen as a continuation of this practice.
[Plutarch], by contrast, both points up the ‘philosophical’ character of this retreat73
and asserts that Isocrates failed in his purpose in this pursuit and so changed to a
different tack: diamarta´nwn de` th˜v proaire´sewv, tou´twn me`n a pe´sth, scolh˜v d
h gei˜to. In Dionysius, who is eager to ofﬁciate at the wedding of philosophy and
oratory, Isocrates’ ‘philosophical’ phase is the consummation of his achievement;
for [Plutarch], who is not, it is an unsuccessful aberration.
One might also remark in passing on another case where it is possible that
[Plutarch] is strategically recasting his sources in order to suit his own view of the
relationship between philosophy and rhetoric. This concerns an odd omission in his
list of the pupils of Isocrates (837C–D). This includes both such celebrated alumni
as Theopompus and Ephorus and more obscure ﬁgures such as Asclepiades and
Theodektas, yet it conspicuously fails to mention Xenophon. It is noteworthy that
this omission is duly rectiﬁed at the appropriate point in Photius’ Bibliotheca.74 In
the light of the observations above, it is perhaps possible to speculate why
[Plutarch] left him out. While our author is perfectly aware of Xenophon’s work as
a historian,75 the description of him as o Swkratiko´v at 845E shows that [Plutarch]
shares the general tendency of antiquity to think of him primarily as a philosopher.76
To introduce a person of this philosophical bent as a student of the rhetorician
Isocrates would have blurred our author’s established dichotomy between the two dis-
ciplines. There again, one should not, perhaps, read too much into this omission. It has
already been noted that [Plutarch] has no objection to the reverse process of describ-
ing orators as students of Plato, and several alleged pupils of Isocrates with no philo-
sophical leanings whatever are passed over just as silently as Xenophon.77
72 Dion. Hal. Isoc. 1: e pi` to` gra´fein a dianohqei´h kate´fugen; [Plut.] 837B: e pi` to` filosofei˜n
kai` gra´fein a dianohqei´h e tra´peto.
73 Note the insertion of e pi` to` filosofei˜n in the [Plutarch] passage, which is not there in
Dionysius.
74 Phot. Bibl. codex 260. R. Henry, Photius: Bibliothe`que Tome 8 (Paris, 1977), 44, n. 5,
doubts that this insertion is the work of Photius himself, but even if it is ‘une glose qui a e´te´
introduite dans la tradition’, it remains signiﬁcant that someone was troubled by [Plutarch]’s
omission.
75 Note the reference to the Hellenica at 845E.
76 Diogenes Laertius, for example, gives him a biography as such (Diog. Laert. 2.48–59); it
is suggestive that Diogenes does not mention the tradition of study with Isocrates either. For the
attitude of Plutarch himself to Xenophon, L. Van der Stockt, ‘“Polybiasasthai”? Plutarch on
Timaeus and Phylarchus (and the like)’ in the Acta of ‘The Shadow of Polybius:
Intertextuality as a Research Tool in Greek Historiography’, a 2001 Leuven conference ( forth-
coming), is illuminating.
77 For example, the Atthidographer Androtion; cf. the passages collected at FGrH 324
TT1–2.
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To sum up, therefore, this section’s analysis of [Plutarch]’s coverage of the history
and nature of rhetoric suggests that our author is not, after all, entirely incapable of
putting his own ‘spin’ on the material that he has inherited, and that he is demonstra-
bly setting himself within the tradition of ‘potted biography’ of which Diogenes
Laertius and Flavius Philostratus are the most voluminous extant representatives.
While the preceding section stressed the extent to which the characteristic styles
and preoccupations of [Plutarch]’s sources may be detected in the completed work,
this one has suggested that our author is not always merely a transparent vessel
wherein his untransmuted source-material may be seen.
IV. SOME VERSIONS OF DEMOSTHENES
Even without recourse to the divergent versions whose survival makes it the logical
choice for use as an extended test case, [Plutarch]’s Demosthenes clearly manifests to
the attentive reader certain of the features that have been noted above as characteristic
of our biographer. It contains, for instance, a ﬁne example of [Plutarch]’s far from
infallible eye for inconsistencies in his source-material;78 the basis of Epicles’ gibe
at 848C79 is contradicted by the statement of Demosthenes’ gift for extempore speak-
ing only a few lines later,80 yet our author shows no sign of being troubled by this.
Likewise characteristic is the failure to make use of the Demosthenic material
covered in the other lives or to direct the reader to the material in question; one
scours the Demosthenes in vain for anecdotes about the orator’s dealings with
Isocrates (cf. 837D–E), his failure at the court of Philip (841A), the allegation that
Isaeus wrote the speeches against his guardians (839F), or the claim that Hyperides
surpassed him as an orator (849D).81
The Demosthenes likewise betrays the ﬂuctuations in the deployment of sources
that have already been detected elsewhere in the Lives. Although Aeschines is cited
explicitly only once in the course of the Lives (840F), one can detect certain state-
ments that seem to ﬁnd their original sources in the orator’s speeches. A case in
point is the claim vaguely attributed to ‘certain people’ that Demosthenes was a trans-
vestite; [Plutarch]’s neutral fasi` de´ tinev kai` a sw´twv au to`n biw˜nai, gunaikei´aiv . . .
e sqh˜si crw´menon (847E) masks the tradition’s probable origin in the sneers of
Aeschines in his speech against Timarchus.82 One suspects that this assertion came
to [Plutarch] pre-packaged in an intermediate source; Hermippus, to whom the
Suda attributes the claim that Demosthenes was pro`v ta`v h dona`v a ko´lastov,83 is a
likely candidate.84
The passage on Demosthenes’ personal life therefore exempliﬁes what we have
already noted in Section II above, in its demonstration of the ways in which the bio-
grapher’s sources can be discerned through the texture of his work. At the same time,
however, it brings out the theme of Section III, the ways in which we can nevertheless
78 Noticed as such by Fowler (n. 5), 436, n. A.
79 o neidi´santov d au to`n Epikle´ouv o ti a ei` ske´ptoito.
80 tou`v de` plei´stouv lo´gouv ei pen au toscedia´sav. J. Bollanse´e in G. Schepens (ed.), Die
Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker—Continued, 4A. Biography, fasc. 3 (Leiden, 1999),
419 n. 139, notes that this is the only extant passage from antiquity claiming that
Demosthenes had good improvisational abilities.
81 He does, however, repeat at 848C the information that Lysias was aware of the young
Demosthenes from 836A.
82 Aeschin. 1.131.
83 Suda, s.v. Dhmosqe´nhv.
84 As noted at Bollanse´e (n. 81), 422.
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discern the author’s consistent interests, in that [Plutarch] demonstrates throughout
the Lives a regular fascination with such prurient details, being particularly interested
in sexual idiosyncrasy or incontinence.85 The Demosthenes is therefore of clear use in
bringing out the themes adumbrated above, even without recourse to alternative treat-
ments of the life of the eponymous orator.
However, it remains true that the most fruitful mode of analysis where the
Demosthenes is concerned lies in comparison with the other accounts of its subject’s
career, and above all that from the pen of the genuine Plutarch.86 At its simplest level,
this consists simply of noting the latter’s response to lines of thought which [Plutarch]
leaves untouched. Plutarch, for example, despite his professed unwillingness to
become bogged down in stylistic analysis,87 makes great capital out of the way in
which the pikri´a of Demosthenes’ temperament is mirrored by a like pikri´a in his
rhetoric.88 This is explicit in the passage concerning the nickname ‘Argas’, where
balanced parallel clauses drive home the congruity between character and style (o d
Arga˜v . . . h pro`v to`n tro´pon, w v qhriw´dh kai` pikro`n e te´qh . . . h pro`v to`n lo´gon, w v
a niw˜nta tou`v a krowme´nouv)89 and is kept before the reader’s attention through the
several later characterizations of Demosthenic utterances as pikro´v vel sim.90
Again, observation of the citational habits of [Plutarch] and his inclination to focus
on certain subjects can likewise be illuminated by simple comparison with Plutarch’s
different methodology. Use of material from the speeches of Aeschines constitutes a
good example, in that Plutarch, unlike our biographer, shows a judicious reluctance
to repose much faith in the unsupported testimony of his subject’s sworn enemy.
When he does quote Aeschines’ aspersions on Cleobule’s parentage, he inserts an
authorial disclaimer,91 and, unlike our author, he never alludes to the famous story
of Demosthenes’ drying-up in the presence of Philip, for which Aeschines is, of
course, the witness.92 What makes this silence particularly interesting is that this
anecdote of a great orator whose powers failed him through timidity just when
they would have been most useful offered Plutarch a tempting parallel for Cicero’s
similar failure in the trial of Milo, which he does cover in the parallel Life of
Cicero.93 Likewise, enthusiastic endorsement of Aeschines’ mud-slinging about
Cleobule would have facilitated the comparison which Plutarch explicitly draws
between the relatively humble origins of the two orators, e k me`n a do´xwn kai`
mikrw˜n i scurou`v kai` mega´louv genome´nouv.94 This restraint is not always paralleled
85 Cf. e.g. the scented pillow of Isocrates (839A) and Hyperides’ collection of kept women
(849D).
86 Westermann’s view that [Plutarch]’s Demosthenes represents the second attempt of
Plutarch himself is comprehensively refuted by Schaefer (n. 4), 32–5.
87 Plut. Dem. 3.1: to` de` tou`v lo´gouv a ntexeta´zein kai` a pofai´nesqai . . . e a´somen, on which see
C. B. R. Pelling, ‘“You for me and me for you . . .”: narrator and narratee in Plutarch’s lives’, in
id. (n. 21, Plutarch and History), 267–82, at 272.
88 So correctly J. Mossman, ‘Is the pen mightier than the sword? The failure of rhetoric in
Plutarch’s Demosthenes’, Histos 3 (1999) (http://www.dur.ac.uk/Classics/histos/1999/
mossman.html). For such reﬂections in other lives, see C. B. R. Pelling, ‘Rhetoric, paideia,
and psychology in Plutarch’s lives’, in id. (n. 21, Plutarch and History), 339–47, at 339–40.
89 Plut. Dem. 4.8.
90 Cf. Plut.Dem. 6.3, 8.4, and 11.5. Plutarch regards excessive or pointless pikri´a as a defect,
but recognizes its gadﬂy usefulness; cf. Plut. Phoc. 10.6.
91 Plut. Dem. 4.2: a d Ai sci´nhv o r h´twr ei rhke . . . ou k e comen ei pei˜n ei t a lhqw˜v ei rhken ei te
. . . katayeudo´menov.
92 Aeschin. 2.34–5.
93 Plut. Cic. 35.5.
94 Plut. Dem. 3.4.
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in the later tradition,95 and is noteworthy in Plutarch, who has been accused, not
entirely without justice, of sometimes sharpening his comparisons at the expense
of historical accuracy.96
The list of these examples could easily be extended. It is important to remember,
however, that these divergences are not the result of spur-of-the-moment decisions
by the several authors; rather the slant in each case is aimed at crafting a larger
vision of the life of Demosthenes. The extent to which the different authors are
capable of doing this varies. It has already been seen that [Plutarch]’s ability to do
this, while not negligible, is distinctly limited, whereas the genuine Plutarch’s
mastery of his material is considerably more complete. Nevertheless, su´gkrisiv of
selected passages must not exclude the larger contexts in which these passages are
embedded.
A simple demonstration of this principle is given by the different ways in which our
author, Plutarch, and Zosimus of Ascalon handle the suit brought by Demosthenes
against his guardians. In [Plutarch], he succeeds in the suit but exacts none of the
penalty, tou`v me`n ka fei`vl a rguri´ou, tou`v de` kai` ca´ritov97 (844D). In Plutarch, by con-
trast, he is unable to retrieve more than a portion of his birthright: kateutuch´sav
e kpra˜xai me`n ou de` pollosto`n h dunh´qh me´rov tw˜n patrw¼´wn.98 Finally, according to
Zosimus he was careful to reclaim only what was due to him, not as much as he
could have exacted: to` me`n ga`r h n th˜v deino´thtov th˜v r htorikh˜v, to` de` th˜v
Dhmosqe´nouv filanqrwpi´av.99
Investigation of the larger concepts of Demosthenes being propagated by the differ-
ent authors lays bare the reasons behind this divergence. One of [Plutarch]’s persistent
interests throughout the Lives is the documentation of precise amounts of money,100
an interest not really shared by the two other authors under discussion. His speciﬁca-
tion of the penalty at ten talents is therefore unsurprising. One then notes the differ-
ence in nuance between his account of the orator’s motives and that of Zosimus; he
gives the motives as a rguri´ou and ca´ritov.101 The latter word, of course, tends to carry
a reciprocal do ut des ﬂavour, and so connotes a more pragmatic benevolence far
removed from Zosimus’ filanqrwpi´av, with its implication of a pattern of universal
benignity. This su´gkrisiv makes clear Zosimus’ agenda in telling the story in the
way he does; he wants to give a picture of a Demosthenes whose oratory is prodigious
95 Zosimus of Ascalon (Vitarum Scriptores Graeci Minores, ed. A. Westermann
[Amsterdam, 1964], 297–302, at 297) asserts without qualiﬁcation that Demosthenes e k
gone´wn de` mh` pa´nu ti semnw˜n proelqw`n toi˜v au tou˜ ta kei´nwn sune´kruyen, because he wants to
present Demosthenes as an all but superhuman qei˜ov a nh´r whose triumph over his humble
origins is therefore only to be expected. Demosthenes himself would seem to have deployed
a similar piece of sunoikei´wsiv, if Rutilius Lupus’ excerpt at De ﬁguris 2.9 is genuine.
96 For example, A. B. Bosworth, ‘History and artiﬁce in Plutarch’s Eumenes’, in P. Stadter
(ed.), Plutarch and the Historical Tradition (London, 1992), 56–89.
97 This passage is difﬁcult textually. The manuscripts lack a fei´v, which Wolf inserts from
Photius. Some surgery is clearly required, but Photius’ reading is still problematic, as it is
perhaps doubtful whether a rguri´ou and ca´ritov can stand as bare genitives of cause, even in
[Plutarch]’s idiosyncratic Greek. Perhaps e neka has fallen out after a rguri´ou?
98 Plut. Dem. 6.1.
99 Westermann (n. 95), 299.
100 Cf. eg. the 3,000 drachmas received for dropping the suit against Meidias (844D), the
10,000 drachmas paid to Neoptolemus for training in breath control (844F), the 700 talents
brought by Harpalus (846B), Isocrates’ 1,000-drachma tuition fee (837D), the 250 talents
entrusted to Lycurgus (841D), and the 6,000-drachma ﬁne introduced by the same orator for
women travelling to Eleusis in a carriage (842A).
101 The textual problems noted in n. 97 make any interpretation provisional, however.
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even at this early stage in his career, and it is noteworthy that he drives this point about
Demosthenes’ precocious stature home by having his hero refer to himself by
name.102 This treatment thus follows on nicely from a version of earlier events
which consistently emphasizes the youth’s precocity; Zosimus’ Demosthenes, for
example, turns to oratory while still a lad in order to punish his guardians, whose
fraud he has already detected.103
Plutarch’s treatment is more subtle. He is not really interested in the monetary
aspect of the business, and his reference to it is correspondingly vague, although
one may note that his insistence that Demosthenes did not manage to win back all
his birthright ﬁts in with his general treatment of the orator’s early years as full of
painful toil and hard-won success, in marked contrast to that of Cicero.104 His
concern is rather with the tastes which the experience wakens in Demosthenes;
to´lman de` pro`v to` le´gein . . . labw´n, kai` geusa´menov th˜v peri` tou`v a gw˜nav
filotimi´av kai` duna´mewv, e pecei´rhsen . . . ta` koina` pra´ttein. It will be observed that
Plutarch is here skilfully drawing out the themes to which he alluded at the very
start of the life, where he emphasized the salient points of the characters of
Demosthenes and Cicero, to` filo´timon . . . pro`v de` kindu´nouv a tolmon;105 the filoti-
mi´a from this case will remain with Demosthenes, but the to´lma proves to be short-
lived.106
It is not only 3.3 that is here recalled, however. The conjunction of filotimi´av and
duna´mewv likewise looks back to the two grounds on which Demosthenes admired
Callistratus: e kei´nou me`n e zh´lwse th`n do´xan . . . tou˜ de` lo´gou ma˜llon e qau´mase . . .
th`n  iscu`n pa´nta ceirou˜sqai kai` tiqaseu´ein pefuko´tov.107 The juxtaposition therefore
neatly recapitulates for the reader the tension that Plutarch is plotting between
Demosthenes’ unambiguously admirable devotion to rhetoric as something that can
do things, compelling people to virtue through its du´namiv,108 and his less praise-
worthy yearning for immediate do´xa, an outlook the limitations of which are made
clear near the beginning of this work,109 and laid bare more thoroughly in the accom-
panying Life of Cicero.110 It is worth noting that filotimi´a is by no means an unam-
biguous good in Plutarch’s moral vocabulary.111
Similar powers of architectonic construction are evident in Plutarch’s approach to
the orator’s dealings with the elderly Eunomus and Satyrus. Here, however, our
102 That is, th˜v Dhmosqe´nouv filanqrwpi´av, rather than, for example, th˜v au tou˜
filanqrwpi´av.
103 Westermann (n. 95), 298: w v ga`r e w´ra tou`v . . . e pitro´pouv . . . e rgon poiou˜ntav . . . polem-
i´wn . . . pai˜v me`n w n e ti . . . didaska´loiv e auto`n paredi´dou, i na scoi´h th`n kathgori´an . . .
h konhme´nhn.
104 Mossman (n. 88).
105 Plut. Dem. 3.3.
106 Cf. the criticisms of Eunomus in Dem. 6, prodi´dwsin u p a tolmi´av . . . e auto`n, and the com-
ments of Mossman (n. 88).
107 Plut. Dem. 5.4.
108 This is exempliﬁed by the narrative at 18.2, where, signiﬁcantly, h tou˜ r h´torov du´namiv is
the subject of the sentence.
109 As Mossman (n. 88) notes, there is a meaningful contrast at Plut. Dem. 1.2 between pro-
fessions that aim only at business or fame and the true happiness of virtue.
110 Suggested in the very ﬁrst chapter of his life—ei pei˜n w v a gwniei˜tai to`n Kike´rwna tw˜n
Skau´rwn . . . e ndoxo´teron a podei˜xai—and is rebuked explicitly by the Pythia at Plut. Cic. 5.1;
mh` th`n tw˜n pollw˜n do´xan h gemo´na poiei˜sqai tou˜ bi´ou.
111 See F. Frazier, ‘A propos de la philotimia dans les Vies de Plutarque. Quelques jalons
dans l’histoire d’une notion’, R. Phil. 62 (1988), 109–27; C. B. R. Pelling, ‘Plutarch: Roman
heroes and Greek culture’ in M. Grifﬁn and J. Barnes (edd.), Philosophia Togata I (Oxford,
1989), 199–232, at 209–13, and the passages discussed therein.
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biographer’s input is more illuminating, which makes this example an apposite one
with which to conclude. Both Plutarch and our author include a narrative of individ-
uals consoling Demosthenes after a failure in the assembly, but as well as a change in
personnel, the nature of the advice and the crafting of the anecdotes differ. This
invites examination.
The most interesting aspect of [Plutarch]’s narrative is Demosthenes’ statement on
the importance of actio. There interest lies not in the material, but in the way in which
it is framed. Demosthenes is fed his opportunity by an anonymous questioner and the
expression e rome´nou au to´n tinov . . . (845B).
Investigation reveals that this way of crafting an anecdote is not unique to our
author. In Diogenes Laertius, it becomes almost a structural feature, whereby his
philosophers are given the opportunity to deliver themselves of a succession of
pithy one-liners.112 When Plutarch himself is brought into the equation as well,
matters become still more interesting. What one might, not entirely accurately,113
call the e rome´nou de´ tinov formula turns up only once in the Life of Demosthenes,
and that one occurrence is the work not of Plutarch himself but of Ariston, an
author, like Diogenes Laertius, of lives of philosophers. Here it is Theophrastus
who dispenses the wisdom: e rwthqe´nta ga`r o poi˜o´v tiv au tw¼˜ fai´netai r h´twr o
Dhmosqe´nhv, ei pei˜n. Axiov th˜v po´lewv.114
It is therefore a tempting hypothesis that the e rome´nou de´ tinov formula is a stage-
property of the sort of antiquarian biography for which Diogenes is the best evidence
and the rhythms of which are usually avoided by Plutarch in propria persona. It is its
use in [Plutarch] that is intriguing, since Demosthenes is not the only person to be
asked this question in the Lives. The other is Isocrates at 838F, and his response is
just as illustrative of the qualities of his oratory (in which [Plutarch], as we have
seen, is otherwise little interested) as Demosthenes’ is of his experiences in overcom-
ing his defects.
This example therefore puts us in the unusual position of using other texts to illus-
trate our author’s ingenuity in adapting the characteristic tropes of the biographical
traditions that he inherited, rather than vice versa. In the hands of [Plutarch] (or of
the source from which these two passages were cribbed), what in Diogenes tends
to be a mere opportunity for the exercise of putative wit is melded more organically
with the texture of the narrative. Wit is used to characterize, not merely to sparkle.
The last instance has therefore brought us back to the contention of this study’s
introduction. None would argue that in terms of construction or stylistic control,
The Lives of the Ten Orators is in any way comparable to the works of Plutarch.
However, the very heterogeneity of the piece, and the odd effects that are produced
through the clash of so many ways of writing the stories of the men of old, make it
valuable to one who wishes to explore the modes of this writing which existed
outside the work of a Plutarch. The Lives of the Ten Orators, this study has perhaps
succeeded in demonstrating, is an important and unduly neglected document of the
ancient world’s facility for doing biography, to misquote Dickens, in different voices.
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112 The life of Thales gives a sequence of examples (Diog. Laert. 1.36–7).
113 The exact wording varies in Diogenes Laertius; one ﬁnds pro`v to`n puqo´menon ti´ . . . ,
h rw´thse´ tiv au to`n ei . . . , e rwthqei`v ti´ . . . , all in the passage on Thales in the preceding
footnote.
114 Plut. Dem. 10.2.
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